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SNIE 83.2-64 ADVCON  
17 JANUARY 1964

*SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE*

THE DANGER OF SUBVERSION IN HONDURAS

- Background
- The Military Regime
- Opposition Forces
- Short Run Prospects for Subversion
- Longer Run Threats to the Present Regime

NOTE: This is an advance copy of the conclusions of this estimate as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The complete text will be circulated within five days of this issuance.

Central Intelligence Agency

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*Submitted by the*  
**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.*

*Concurred in by the*  
**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD**

*on 17 January 1964. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.*

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

17 January 1964

SUBJECT: SNIE 83.2-64: THE DANGER OF SUBVERSION IN HONDURAS

## CONCLUSION

In the short run, the only potential threat to the military regime in Honduras would be a falling out among its leaders. There are indications of growing tension within the ruling group. Isolated terrorist acts will almost certainly continue, but, unless and until the Communists and pro-Castroites improve their own capabilities for subversion and gain the cooperation of the deposed Liberals and other political groupings, the regime can handle any subversive threat they try to mount. The Liberals and the mass labor organizations, for their part, will probably avoid violence so long as they have reasonable grounds to hope for an eventual return to constitutionality -- which the regime now promises for mid-1965. Should they lose this hope and conclude that the López regime is bent on indefinite tenure and suppressive rule, they would in time probably join with the extremists in subversive activities.

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